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SOVEREIGNTY STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A COMMENT
T. Alexander Aleinikoff*
Constitutional law casebooks are based on an unstated, and
perhaps unrecognized, set of assumptions that link constitutional
law to a strong conception of the nation-state. This is the explicit message of the periodicization of constitutional law into a
Founding Period, Reconstruction, and the New Deal forward.
Each stage represents a new and larger understanding of the
reach of federal power. Concomitant "rise of rights" narratives
reinforce the onward and upward march of the state. The rights
are state-based-that is, they arise from constitutional provisions
and statutes, not international law or human rights conventions-and state-enforced. Their implementation has required
the deployment of significant state resources and the development of sophisticated state apparatuses. There is surprisingly little in either orthodox or revisionist accounts that destabilize the
state. (While post-modern and critical perspectives offer obvious destabilization vantage points, traditional conservative and
liberal theory could do the same through notions of natural
rights and universalism.)
Don't get me wrong. I'm a fan of the nation-state. It is, I
believe, the only organized political force able to effectively pursue social justice and social peace. My purpose here is to note
the rather unselfconscious way in which constitutional casebook
writers "assume the state." By this I mean that casebooks begin
with an implicit model of a state exercising (lawful) authority
over a people (citizens) and territory. The major questions addressed are the scope of that authority and its distribution
among various state agents (federalism, separation of powers).
Citizens are figured as both authors (Marbury) and objects of
state power (regulated, e.g., under the commerce clause); and
significant attention is paid to constitutional norms condemning
*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University.

197

198

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 17:197

"second-class citizenship" (equal protection, privileges and immunities).
But this seems to start the story in the middle. "We the
People" are busy governing and being governed while we reside
on the territory of the United States. Yet we have not investigated who fits within the category of "We the People," nor how
territory was acquired. More important, it is also a very limited
story: it does not seek to problematize membership rules or examine whether state power extends beyond territorial borders; it
ignores other polities within our midst (Indian tribes; territorial
governments); it doesn't recognize levels of membership (immigrants, residents of the District of Columbia); and it fails to ask
what force legal norms established outside the nation-state could
or should have.
Perhaps this is a somewhat random list of topics. But I
think the issues fit within a category I will call "sovereignty
studies." First let me note the range of questions that could be
addressed under this heading. Then I will suggest why doing so
might be worthwhile.
THE CONTENT OF "SOVEREIGNTY STUDIES"
Constitutional casebooks would not have to craft unlikely
hypotheticals to address issues related to nation-state sovereignty. The U.S. Reports offer up a wide array of interesting, already-decided cases. Consider the following:
1. Citizenship: The issues here are as challenging as they
are obvious: what are the norms for determining who constitute
"We the People"? Most casebooks have snippets from Dred
Scott (including the infamous lines that permit an easy expression of outrage-and ignoring interesting questions about congressional regulation of the territories and state regulation of
citizenship). But there is almost no discussion of the background
of, or justification for, the American system of jus soli (written
into the Constitution to overturn Dred Scott). 1

1. For a discussion of the case for jus soli, see generally Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 54 (1997) (discussion of
birthright citizenship rationale and impact of a departure from "birthplace rule"); see
also Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in
the American Polity (Yale U. Press, 1985) (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment does not
mandate citizenship for children born in the United States to undocumented aliens).
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Nor is there mention of the birthright citizenship of tribal
Indians (denied, as a constitutional matter, in Elk v. Wilkins) or
persons born in the territories, or of the dramatic Warren Court
cases all but eliminating Congress' power to terminate U.S. citizenship (Afroyim v. Rusk.and its progeny). (Bickel has an interesting critique of the denationalization cases in The Morality of
Consent; but they have otherwise gone largely unnoticed among
constitutional generalists.)
2. Immigration: Citizenship law regulates access to state
membership; immigration law regulates access to state territory.
The Constitution does not specifically list the power to enact immigration laws, and early immigration cases declared such
power to be "inherent" in the national state. These cases display
a source of power not usually examined in casebook chapters on
congressional authority. (We frequently talk of enumerated
rights, but rarely of the state's unenumerated powers.) Recent
scholarship has noted the influence of these cases on the Court's
Curtiss-Wright decision, suggesting that recognition of a broad
foreign affairs powers owes more to 19th century precedents
than to New Deal ideas about expansive federal authority. 2 (The
Chinese Exclusion Case and other immigration cases of the day
are also remarkable social texts-on a par with Dred Scott-regarding attitudes towards immigrants of color.)
It is rarely noted that most of the rights protected by the
Constitution are not limited to citizens. How, then, ought constitutional membership be defined? 3 Why isn't the category of
rights-holders congruent with the category of governors? Equal
protection doctrine establishes separate rules for states and the
federal government (compare Graham v. Richardson with
Mathews v. Diaz). How does this structure comport with the
usual story we tell about Brown and Bolling v. Sharpe?
3. Indian cases: Casebooks talk of the dual sovereignty of
the federal government and the states. But from the earliest
2. See generally Sarah H. Oeveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss·
Wright, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1127 (1999) (commentary on White's article and the issue of
nineteenth-century origins of doctrine of inherent plenary power); G. Edward White,
The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1
(1999) (review of early twentieth-century constitutional jurisprudence on foreign rela·
lions).
3. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the
Constitution, 7 Const. Comm. 9 (1990) (suggesting that concept of membership might
embrace legal resident aliens as well as citizens). Plyler v. Doe presents this question in
most stark form.
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days, Indian tribes have been recognized as sovereign political
bodies. John Marshall's "trilogy" is rarely read, but speaks volumes about the preexisting sovereignty of the tribes, federal
powers and federalism.
As with immigration, Congress is deemed to have "plenary
authority" over the tribes, but the source and scope of such
power is controversial and contested (again, an appropriate
question for an introductory law class considering heads of federal power). The Court has held that the Bill of Rights does not
apply to the actions of tribal governments (Talton v. Mayes).
How can that be? How can there be a government on U.S. territory not bound by the Constitution?
4. Territories cases: The debate over territorial power at
the turn of the 19th century is responsible for two well-known
statements in constitutional law: that the Constitution "follows
the flag" and that the Supreme Court "follows the election returns." The Insular Cases (and other territorial cases) represent
great theoretical battles, as the Court had to come to grips with
the constitutional implications of American empire building.4
The Court's recognition of Congress' "plenary power" over the
territories (compare Taney's view in Dred Scott) was based on
the widely-shared view that the (uncivilized) residents of the
new possessions required federal tutelage-they were, in
Kipling's 1899 formulation, the "white man's burden." The
cases thus resonated with the Court's race and Indian cases of
the day, yet provide a marked contrast to the usual stories we
tell about restrictions on state power in the age of Lochner.
Puerto Rico was established as a "Commonwealth" in 1952,
but exactly what that means in constitutional terms has remained
unclear. Congress has maintained that it has plenary power to
alter the government of Puerto Rico as it sees fit; the Commonwealth has asserted that Congress may not change its organic law
without Commonwealth consent. Puerto Ricans, who have been
citizens since 1917, pay no federal income tax and do not vote in
presidential elections. The Supreme Court has slowly granted
residents of the island most constitutional rights, but federal laws
treating them less favorably than citizens of the states are subject
to minimal judicial review.
4. The argument that the Constitution applied in the territories was an arrow in the antiimperial quiver: since it was generally agreed that Filipinos and other new ''nationals" were not
civilized enough to assume full membership in the American polity, recognition that they were
entitled to political rights would force Congress to dispose of the territories.
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Twice in the past decade Puerto Ricans have voted on
status. (The last time "none of the above" won.) The prospect
of Puerto Rican statehood would align a state's borders with nationality, presenting very different kinds of federalism issues.
The option of "enhanced commonwealth status"-under which
Puerto Rico could resist the application of some federal lawswould strike at Congress' plenary power. 5
5. Extraterritorial authority of the state: When the United
States acts overseas against U.S. citizens or non-citizens, does
the Constitution apply?-a question that might be of some interest in an era in which the U.S. is the only world superpower.
Cases such as Reid v. Covert and United States v. VerdugoUrquidez receive little or no treatment in most casebooks. Gerald Neuman's excellent book Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders and Fundamental Law provides rich historical,
theoretical and case-based materials.
WHY "SOVEREIGNTY STUDIES"?
One might offer the following response to this list of issues:
So what? There are lots of interesting constitutional topics that
don't fit into the curriculum (e.g., the Gold Clause Cases, Abelman v. Booth (my favorite), and the direct tax cases6). Life is
short and class time even shorter. Why should space be made
for the-admittedly interesting-sovereignty cases?
This answer, I believe, starts with the recognition that the
nation-state is not "natural." That we live in a world of nationstates should not immunize that form of political organization
from critical analysis. In particular, the claims of liberal democratic states to territorial sovereignty and control over the rules
of membership need to be interrogated.
Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that the nationstate form will be around forever. We are currently witnessing
5. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Pueno Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 Const. Comrn. 15 (1994) (overview of constitutional issues
on scope of federal power over Puerto Rico and rights of its residents). The territories
are diverse in their interests and their political relationship with the mainland. Guam,
where the indigenous Chamorro people have lost majority status, would like to be able to
adopt its own immigration policy. The people of American Samoa are nationals but not
citizens of the United States. The people of the Freely Associated States of Micronesia
are neither U.S. citizens nor nationals, yet the U.S. government assumes responsibility
for their external security.
6. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 (1999).
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serious challenges to nation-state sovereignty from three directions. First, supra-national norms and structures (international
human rights law, the WTO) impinge upon sovereignty in unprecedented ways. The claim here is not that states have been
hermetically sealed up to this point; it is rather that interference
in state sovereignty is now being justified in legal terms that
carry increasing weight around the world.
Second, subnational groups are demanding (and receiving)
increasing degrees of autonomy (Scotland, East Timor, Canadian Indian bands). In the United States, devolution has largely
been discussed in federalism terms; and demands of minority
groups have generally followed a civil rights/anti-discrimination
agenda. But throughout much of the rest of the world, indigenous and ethnic groups have pursued more robust models of
self-governance.7 Although all but ignored by constitutional
casebooks, these issues have been seriously debated in the
United States for more than two centuries (regarding the sovereignty of Indian tribes) and are currently major topics in Puerto
Rico and Guam. 8
As international norms regarding the rights of indigenous
people continue to mature/ their importance for U.S. constitutional law should increase. More importantly, political movements elsewhere in the world will likely influence activities in the
territories and on the reservations. In short, these will be significant constitutional questions in the days ahead.
I will label the third dimension along which sovereignty is
under challenge as "transnationalism" -the presence within
state borders of communities of non-nationals with significant
ties across borders. Transnationalism is a function of the high
levels of immigration that most liberal democratic states have
witnessed in the past several decades. 10 Immigrant populations
expose a fundamental paradox in liberal democratic thought:
liberalism purports to be grounded on universal norms of individual rights, yet democracies need a definition of "the demos"
in order to be functioning polities. 11
7. See generally Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (1993).
8. There is a small and sophisticated group of scholars exploring issues relating to
tribal sovereignty but almost no scholarly attention to Guam.
9. See generally James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford U.
Press, 1996).
10. The numbers here are not trivial: almost 10% of the U.S. population today is
foreign-born.
11. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982): "The exclusion of
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By placing outsiders inside- making immigrants subject to
state control but not permitting participation in governanceimmigration makes this tension palpable. In legal terms, it is the
tension between Plyler v. Doe and Proposition 187; between
equal protection and the 1996 immigration acts that made permanent resident aliens ineligible for means-tested social benefits.
Transnationalism is also a story about the growing ties between immigrant populations and their countries of origin (as
well as increasing levels of dual nationality). To some, transnationalism presents real risks to the nation-state because it produces dual loyalty. Double commitments may be especially
troubling to states that have no unifying ethnic or religious basis
and thus look primarily to forms of civic attachment to hold heterogeneous populations together. Concerns are heightened
when the governments of the countries of origin seek the support of their extra-territorial populations in relations with receiving states. One forum in which these concerns play out is the
controversy over naturalization oaths that demand that new citizens renounce allegiance to all other states. (The United States
has had a renunciation requirement since its first naturalization
statute in 1790; Australia and Canada do not require renunciation.) Such requirements are increasingly problematic because
of new laws in sending states that permit nationals to naturalize
elsewhere without losing their original citizenship. 12 How does
the receiving state assure itself of the "loyalty" of new citizensa loyalty now considered more important in light of the challenges to sovereignty just identified?
Together, these issues make our usual assumptions about
sovereignty appear naive. American constitutional law can continue to proceed as if we know who "We the People" are, as if
sovereignty is absolute and indivisible, but the world is changing
around us. There are ample materials at hand with which to begin to address these increasingly important issues. I suggest we
begin to put them front and center in our teaching materials.

aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in the democratic system but
a necessary consequence of the community's process of political self-definition. Selfgovernment ... begins by defining the scope of the community of the governed and thus
of the governors as well: Aliens are by definition outside of this community." See generally Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference That Alienage Makes,
69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047 (1994) (analysis of alien status under law).
12. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46
Emory L.J. 1411 (1997) (overview of dual nationality and problems with attempts to curb dual
nationality).

